Healthcare providers can choose to be covered by the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act by becoming a “qualified healthcare provider.”  All that is required to be a “qualified provider” is the purchase of a particular insurance policy and payment of a surcharge to the Patients Compensation Fund.  As of July 1, 2019, the policy must be in the amount of $500,000.00.  The surcharge, which varies by specialty and provider, helps to fund an additional $1,300,000.00 in coverage.  If a provider is a qualified provider, a patient’s recovery is capped at $1,800,000.00 – no matter the amount of the damages.  If a provider chooses not to purchase the minimum insurance, there is no cap on damages and the other protections of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act do not apply.

To recover for medical malpractice in Indiana, a patient must show that a medical provider violated his/her standard of care to the patient and that violation caused harm to the patient.  Generally, the lawsuit must be brought within two (2) years of the date of the malpractice with very limited exceptions.  Unlike other types of lawsuits, a patient cannot immediately file a lawsuit against the healthcare provider.  Instead, the patient must file a claim with the Indiana Department of Insurance alleging malpractice. Following the filing of this claim, a medical review panel of three (3) doctors is then selected to review the claim.  Both the patient and the healthcare provider(s) submit evidence to the panel, who then review the claim and issue an opinion.  This, however, is not the end of the claim.

Once a review panel opinion is issued, regardless of the decision of the panel, the patient can then file a claim in a state court.  If the medical review panel found no malpractice, a patient must submit an expert opinion from a similar provider, stating that the expert disagrees with the panel opinion and that he/she believes that the healthcare providers conduct was below the standard of care.  Once that occurs, the case can continue in state court.

Medical malpractice cases are highly specialized and, unlike many other court cases, require specific, expert opinions.  If you believe you have been harmed by medical malpractice, you should contact an attorney who specializes in this area of law to help you navigate this complex process.

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What is an Invitee?

An “invitee” is a person who has entered a property at the express or implied invitation of the owner.  Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 1991).   However, an invitation does not have to come from the landowner and it does not need to be expressly given.  Yates v. Johnson County Board of Commissioners, 888N.E.2d 842, 850 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting: Kopczynski v. Barger, 887 N.E.2d 928, at 931 (Ind. 2008)).  Instead, an implied invitation is sufficient, and can be inferred from a landowner’s acts or conduct.  Id. at 849. The term “invitees” include social guests, business invitees, and public invitees.

What Duty does a Landowner Owe to an Invitee?

A property owner owes an invitee the duty to exercise reasonable care for his/her safety while he/she is on the property. That duty is the same whether the invitee is a social guest, a business invitee, or a public invitee.

A landowner is subject to liability for an injury suffered by an invitee due to a condition on the land if the owner: (1) knew or by the exercises of reasonable care would have discovered the condition and should have realized that it involved an unreasonable risk of harm to the invitee; (2) should have expected that the invitee would not discover or realize the danger, or would fail to protect himself against it; and (3) failed to exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee against the danger.  Burrell, 569 N.E.2d at 639-640.

Can the Landowner Claim I Assumed the Risk?

Incurred risk is defined as follows:

It involves a mental state of venturousness on the part of the actor, and demands a subjective analysis into the actor’s actual knowledge and voluntary acceptance of the risk. By definition … the very essence of incurred risk is the conscious deliberate and intentional embarkation upon the course of conduct with knowledge of the circumstances. It requires much more than the general awareness of potential for mishap. Incurred risk contemplates acceptance of a specific risk of which the plaintiff has actual knowledge.  Town of Highland v. Zerkel, 659 N.E.2d 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)

What if I Signed a Waiver or a Release of Liability?

The Indiana Court of Appeals has held that a written contract may release a landowner from liability for damages caused by the landowner’s own negligence.  The State Group Industrial Limited v. Murphy & Associates Industrial Services, Inc., 878 N.E.2d 475, 480 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).  However, in order to be enforced, the release must clearly and unequivocally manifest a commitment by the invitee, knowingly and willingly made to pay for damages occasioned by the landowner’s negligence.  Id.  Therefore, exculpatory clauses seeking to indemnify a landowner against its own negligence must specifically and explicitly refer to the negligence of the landowner seeking to be released from liability.  As a result, Indiana courts have refused to release landowners from liability based on exculpatory provisions that are phrased in general terms.  Powell v. American Health Fitness Center of Fort Wayne, Inc., 694 N.E.2d 757, 761-762 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).

Conclusion

If you were injured on someone else’s property it is always best to speak with an attorney who has knowledge of premise liability actions. Depending on whether you had invitee or licensee status while on the premises, you may be entitled to compensation for your injuries from either the property owner or the property owner’s insurance policy. For more information about this topic, or to schedule a free consultation, please contact the law office of Tate & Bowen LLP to schedule a free consultation.

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Bad faith on the part of ones insurance company can come about in a variety of ways.  The Indiana Supreme Court in Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman, identified some of these ways, albeit not in an exhaustive list.  622 N.E.2d 515, 519 (Ind. 1993) (“The obligation of good faith and fair dealing with respect to the discharge of the insurer’s contractual obligation includes the obligation to refrain from (l) making an unfounded refusal to pay policy proceeds; (2) causing an unfounded delay in making payment; (3) deceiving the insured; and (4) exercising any unfair advantage to pressure an insured into a settlement of his claim.”).  Another scenario in which bad faith may arise is a refusal by ones insurance company to defend them.  There are many more scenarios in which a bad faith claim may arise, and if you feel that your insurance company may
have wronged you, contact Tate & Bowen LLP for a free consultation.

These obligations do not mean that an insurance company cannot, in good faith, deny or dispute your claim.  An insurance company’s denial or dispute of your claim needs to have a rational basis, even if the denial was made in error, unless significant errors are present.  A wrongful denial alone does not impute bad faith unless there was no rational basis. Recovery may be sought against your insurance company if they failed to act in good faith through compensatory and punitive damages, making recovery against your insurance company potentially in excess of the policy limits depending on the nature of your insurance company’s actions.

In addition to a claim of bad faith, there is a separate claim of breach of contract that may exist if your insurance company breaches your contract with them.  If you have a insurance contract, and
your insurance company breached it, whether through a denial of your claim or a refusal to defend you among other things, you may have a separate claim for breach of contract even if the insurers conduct did not equate to bad faith.  For assistance in determining whether you have a claim for breach of contract, contact Tate & Bowen LLP for a free consultation.

To schedule a free consultation, fill out our Free Consultation form, or call us at (317) 296-5294

DISCLAIMER: All information included in the above blog is solely for informational purposes. The information above does not create an attorney/client relationship and should not be interpreted as legal advice. Seek legal advice on the topic before relying on any information contained herein, as laws change and the information may be out-of-date.

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Sobriety Checkpoints raise two separate constitutional issues. First, constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Fourth Amendment reads: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. ”

The second issue is constitutionality of a Sobriety Checkpoint stop under Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. While Article I, Section 11 reads almost identical to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the application is independent from the Fourth Amendment, the analysis differs, and the protections can go beyond its federal counterpart. See State v. Gerschoffer, 763 N.E.2d 960, 965 (Ind. 2002);  see also  State v. Bulington, 802. N.E.2d 435, 438 (Ind. 2004).

Under the Fourth Amendment, the Court will look at federal requirements (i.e., warrants, probable cause, etc.) to determine whether the search and seizure were valid. See Trowbridge v. State, 717 N.E.2d 138, 143 (Ind. 1999).  Under Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, the Indiana Court of Appeals has placed the burden on the State to show that the intrusion was reasonable under a “totality of the circumstances” analysis. Bullington, 802 N.E.2d at 438.

I. Was the Stop Made Pursuant to a Checkpoint

If you were not pulled directly in to a Sobriety Checkpoint, and instead were stopped outside the Sobriety Checkpoint (i.e., by a chase car), the State may try to argue that your stop was not made pursuant to a Sobriety Checkpoint and that the constitutionality of the Sobriety Checkpoint itself has no bearing. If a stop is found to not be made pursuant to a Sobriety Checkpoint, the analysis would then hinge on the factors of a valid traffic stop and/or Terry stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

In King v. State, police officers set up a Sobriety Checkpoint. While conducting the Sobriety Checkpoint, an officer observed King driving in the grass to avoid the Sobriety Checkpoint, and subsequently pulled him over, away from the Sobriety Checkpoint itself. King v. State, 877 N.E.2d 518, 520-521 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).  The trial court denied the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress the stop and evidence seized as a result of the stop which alleged unconstitutionality of the Sobriety Checkpoint, and the Defendant filed an interlocutory appeal. Id.

The Indiana Court of Appeals held in King that the State’s actions in operating the checkpoint were unconstitutional and specifically violated Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Id. at 525.  Further, the Court held that in light of the unconstitutionality of the checkpoint, it need not address the issue of whether or not the officer had reasonable suspicion to pull the driver over, and reversed the trial courts denial of the Defendant’s motion to suppress. Id. Thus, in light of the Court’s holding in King, even a car stopped outside of a Sobriety Checkpoint can arguably be subject to the same constitutionality analysis of a driver pulled directly in to a checkpoint.

II. Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution

The burden is on the State to prove that, under the totality of the circumstances, a Sobriety Checkpoint was reasonable under Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. There is no burden on the defendant to show that the police checkpoint was unconstitutional when evaluating an Article I, Section 11 violation claim. Gerschoffer, 763 N.E.2d at 965; see also King, 877 N.E.2d at 521.

The totality of the circumstances test and the analysis thereof is laid out in Gerschoffer by the Indiana Supreme Court takes into account and weighs six (6) factors that are relevant to the constitutionality of a Sobriety Checkpoint. Gerschoffer, 763 N.E.2d at 966-71.

1. Neutral Plan Approved by Appropriate Officials

The first factor looks at whether a neutral plan for the Sobriety Checkpoint was present that was approved by appropriate officials. A properly approved, neutral plan helps support the reasonableness of a Sobriety Checkpoint. Id.  The burden is on the State to present evidence of such. Id. at 967. Simply stating that the Sobriety Checkpoint followed “federal and state police guidelines” is not sufficient for this factor to weigh in favor of reasonableness. Id.  Without evidence of a neutral plan approved by appropriate officials, this factor should weigh against the reasonableness and constitutionality of the Sobriety Checkpoint.

2. Objective, Location, and Timing

The second analysis examines whether the Sobriety Checkpoint was “sufficiently related to the legitimate law enforcement purpose of combating drunk driving;” whether there was a link between the timing of the Sobriety Checkpoint and the purpose of combatting drunk driving; and whether there was a link between the location of the Sobriety Checkpoint and the purpose of combatting drunk driving. Id. As held by the Indiana Supreme Court, “[a] seizure is not reasonable unless it is well calculated to effectuate its purpose.” Id. In King v. State, the Court held that a Sobriety Checkpoint conducted near a private house party, targeting a specific group of people instead of the public in general, “did not effectively target the danger of impaired driving.” King, 877 N.E.2d at 522-23. The Court will look for evidence of objective considerations that drunk driving had been a particular problem, at a specific location, during a specific time, which prompted police to target the danger of impaired driving with a Sobriety Checkpoint.

Without a specific showing that a Sobriety Checkpoint “was sufficiently related to the legitimate law enforcement purpose of” “targeting the public danger of impaired driving,” that there was a link between the timing of the police checkpoint and the purpose of combatting drunk driving, and that there was a link between the location of the police checkpoint and the purpose of combatting drunk driving, this factor weighs against the reasonableness and constitutionality of the Sobriety Checkpoint. Gerschoffer, 763 N.E.2d at 967-68.

3. Police Discretion

For the third factor, the Indiana Supreme Court agreed with other jurisdictions in holding that “the degree of discretion exercised by field officers conducting the roadblock [is] a critical factor.” Id. A Court will look at the amount of cars pulled into a Sobriety Checkpoint at a time, the procedures that an officer follows when approaching and screening motorists, and the discretion each officer had in deciding what type of sobriety test to perform. The State must show that “it provided sufficiently explicit guidance to ensure against arbitrary or inconsistent actions by the screening officer.” Id. Failure to show consistency and guidance, and/or enter any evidence of this into the record, should lead a Court to finding that this very important factor would weigh against the reasonableness and constitutionality of the Sobriety Checkpoint.

4. Degree of Intrusion

For the fourth factor, the State must show that the degree of intrusion was reasonable. Id. at 969. In analyzing this factor, a Court will look at the average time of detention when a vehicle is pulled into a Sobriety Checkpoint and no violations is detected, as well as whether the Sobriety Checkpoint was avoidable. The reasonableness of average detention time is in the discretion of the Court. For guidance, in Gerschoffer, the Court held that the reasonableness of an average detention of four minutes when an officer did not detect any violations was questionable at best. Id.

A Court will look at signage and location for a Sobriety Checkpoint. Specifically, they will look at the visibility of the signage, and that it was sufficiently ahead of a Sobriety Checkpoint to inform a Driver of a Sobriety Checkpoint to a degree that they could still avoid it. Placing signage only directly at the entrance of the Checkpoint should not be sufficient. “The more avoidable a Sobriety Checkpoint is, the less it interferes with the liberty of individual drivers.” Id.

Absent any evidence that the timing of the average detention of drivers when no violation was detected was reasonable, and of the ability to avoid a Sobriety Checkpoint, should weigh against the reasonableness and constitutionality of the Sobriety Checkpoint under this factor.

5. Safe Conditions

For the fifth factor, the Court will weigh the overall safety of the Sobriety Checkpoint. In Gerschoffer, the Court held that “[t]o be constitutionally reasonable, the location and timing of sobriety checkpoints should take into account police officer safety, public safety, and public convenience.” Id. at 968. Some factors the Court will look at are the weather (i.e., rainy/clear/snowy), the lighting of the checkpoint (i.e., auxiliary or street lighting), and the overall operation of the checkpoint (i.e., were all the individuals directing traffic properly trained). Additional factors may be presented (i.e., condensing five (5) lanes into one for the purposes of a Sobriety Checkpoint could arguably present a danger to drivers). Failure by the State to present sufficient evidence of these factors should lead to this factor weighing against the reasonableness and constitutionality of the Sobriety Checkpoint.

6. Effectiveness

Lastly, a Court will take into account the effectiveness of a Sobriety Checkpoint, after the fact. In Gerschoffer, the Court reviewed the apprehension rate of the roadblock in question, while also noting that possible deterrence through advance publicity should also be taken in to account. Id. at 970.  This factor is also in the discretionary opinion of the Court. For reference, in Gerschoffer, the Indiana Supreme Court held that where seventy (7) cars were stopped and two (2) individuals were arrested for operating while intoxicated in two (2) hours, the percentage was fairly low. Id.

In order for the Court to weigh the possibility of deterrence through advance publicity, the State must present evidence of actual media outlet publicity. The Court will not simply infer that the Sobriety Checkpoint was effectively deterred by publicity without evidence of such publicity. Id. Without a showing by the State that the Checkpoint was reasonably effective, this factor should weigh against the reasonableness and constitutionality of the Sobriety Checkpoint.

7. Conclusion

The burden is on the State to prove the reasonableness of all six (6) factors set out by the Indiana Supreme Court in Gerschoffer, and reaffirmed in King, for a Sobriety Checkpoint to be constitutionally valid under Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The Court will weigh the factors under a totality of the circumstances, and no one factor is determinative in its own right.

III. Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution

In addition to the Gerschoffer analysis, a challenge under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution will prompt the Court to look at federal requirements (i.e., warrants, probable cause, etc.) to determine whether the search and seizure was valid. Trowbridge, 717 N.E.2d at 143. The Indiana Court of Appeals in Sublett v. State held that traffic checkpoints are constitutional under the Fourth Amendment under particular circumstances. 815 N.E.2d 1031, 1034 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).  Specifically, the Court applied a three-part test. Id.; citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).  The three-part test balanced the State’s interest in preventing accidents that occurred as a result of drunk driving, the degree to which a traffic checkpoint advances a public interest, and the level of intrusion upon the privacy of an individual that results from the traffic checkpoint. Id.

Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides a more prudent road to challenging a Sobriety Checkpoint in the State of Indiana. It is unlikely that an Indiana appellate Court will challenge the magnitude of eradicating drunken driving as a public interest, the degree to which a Sobriety Checkpoint advances that interest, and that the measure of intrusion upon a motorist stopped briefly at a sobriety checkpoint was more than slight based on its past holdings.

IV. Conclusion

If you or someone you know has been arrested as a result of a Sobriety Checkpoint, it is important to contact an experienced attorney immediately. The attorneys at Tate & Bowen LLP are here to assist and protect your rights. For information on fighting your criminal charges, please contact Tate & Bowen LLP at 317-296-5294 to help guide you through the process.

DISCLAIMER:
All information included in the above blog is solely for informational purposes. The information above does not create an attorney/client relationship and should not be interpreted as legal advice. Seek legal advice on the topic before relying on any information contained herein, as laws change and the information may be out-of-date.

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Being stopped for traffic violations is an all too common occurrence. Whether it’s for speeding, rolling through a stop sign, or running a red light, we have all been in the uncomfortable position of being pulled over by police officers. As of April 21, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a ruling that significantly limits the length of traffic stops, and investigative tools available to police officers during stops. In a 6-3 vote in Rodriguez v. United States, Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, stating that “A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation. . . . [and] authority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are – or reasonably should have been – completed.” According to the Court, an officer’s mission in a traffic stop includes determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, and other “ordinary inquires incident to [the traffic] stop.” These ordinary inquiries typically involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, inspecting the automobiles registration and proof of insurance, and other checks to ensure traffic, and officer safety.

Effectively, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion means that traffic stops must remain reasonably short. Police officers are permitted to stop drivers for only as long as it takes the officer to reasonably address the infraction. Unless there is reasonable suspicion of a crime other than the traffic violation, officers are not permitted to prolong the traffic stop for inquires uncommon to such a violation. Specifically, Justice Ginsburg noted that officers cannot prolong a traffic stop just to perform a dog-sniffing search absent reasonable suspicion. Dog-sniffing searches are not ordinary incidents of a traffic stop, as they do not pertain to traffic and officer safety interests, but rather “the Government’s endeavor to detect crime in general or drug trafficking in particular.” Therefore, conducting a dog-sniff search without independent reasonable suspicion lengthens the time of the stop, and violates The Fourth Amendment’s shield against unreasonable seizures.

It is important to remember that if there is reasonable suspicion, officers are permitted to prolong a traffic stop to perform investigations unrelated to the traffic violation. And, without reasonable suspicion, officers are permitted to perform certain, unrelated investigations that do not lengthen a roadside detention.

If you or someone you know has been arrested during a traffic stop, it is important to contact an experienced attorney immediately. The attorneys at Tate & Bowen LLP are here to assist and protect your rights. For information on fighting criminal charges relating to a traffic stop, please contact Tate & Bowen LLP at 317-296-5294 to help guide you through the process.

______________________________________________________________________

Footnotes

FN1 – For reference and full text See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015)

DISCLAIMER:
All information included in the above blog is solely for informational purposes. The information above does not create an attorney/client relationship and should not be interpreted as legal advice. Seek legal advice on the topic before relying on any information contained herein, as laws change and the information may be out-of-date.

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Have you had your cell phone searched by a police officer after you were arrested? As of June 25, 2014, the Supreme Court of the United States held that, generally, without a warrant, a police officer may not have access to an arrested individual’s digital information on a seized cell phone. Essentially the decision states that if your cell phone was searched without your consent and/or without a warrant, then any information the officer recovered may not be admissible as evidence against you in your criminal proceedings. It should be noted that there are limited exceptions where an officer could search your cell phone without your consent and without a search warrant and that information obtained may be used against you.

If there is no warrant and no consent by the arrested individual a warrantless search is reasonable if it falls within specific exceptions. The Court looked at three expectations to determine if a warrantless cell phone search would be permissible. It was reasonable for an officer to: 1. search an arrested individual to remove any weapons to ensure officer safety and to ensure the individual does not have access to anything that might aid him in escaping incarceration. 2. search and seize any evidence that is on the person so that that evidence cannot be destroyed. 3. open a closed container that was found on the arrested person to ensure officer safety and containment of the arrestee.

The Court noted the amount of personal information that is stored on cell phones is relatively high. Additionally, once arrested, the phone is no longer accessible to the individual and therefore cannot be used as a weapon, aid in eluding incarceration, and evidence on the phone cannot be destroyed because of the lack of access. Thus, the Court now requires most searches of cell phones to have voluntary consent by the arrested individual or a search warrant.

For information on fighting your criminal convictions, please contact the attorneys at Tate & Bowen LLP to help guide you through the process at 317-296-5294.

DISCLAIMER:
All information included in the above blog is solely for informational purposes. The information above does not create an attorney/client relationship and should not be interpreted as legal advice. Seek legal advice on the topic before relying on any information contained herein, as laws change and the information may be out-of-date.

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A landlord may not bring an action against the tenant to enforce any of these obligations unless the landlord gives the tenant notice of the tenant’s noncompliance. 
The landlord must also give tenant a reasonable amount of time to remedy the noncompliance. If the landlord is successful in an action against the tenant, the landlord may collect actual damages, reasonable costs, and attorney fees.

Landlord’s obligations include the following:
(1) Deliver the rental premises to a tenant in compliance with the rental agreement, and in a safe, clean, and habitable condition;
(2) Comply with all health and housing codes applicable to the rental premises;
(3) Make all reasonable efforts to keep common areas of a rental premises in a clean and proper condition;
(4) Provide and maintain all electrical, plumbing, and sanitary systems; all heating, ventilating and air conditioning systems; elevators; and all appliances supplied as an inducement to the rental in good and safe working condition.

A tenant may bring a cause of action in a court of jurisdiction to enforce the landlord’s obligations. The tenant must first notify the landlord of the noncompliance and allow the landlord reasonable time to make repairs or provide a remedy to the condition described in the tenant’s notice. If the tenant is successful in an action against the landlord, the tenant may collect actual damages, reasonable costs, and attorney fees. A landlord’s liability for damages begins when the landlord has notice or actual knowledge of noncompliance and
the landlord has either refused to remedy the noncompliance, or
failed to remedy the noncompliance within a reasonable amount of time following the notice or actual knowledge, whichever occurs first.

SECURITY DEPOSIT
The landlord may withhold a portion of the tenant’s security deposit to cover any rent in arrears, any damages to the residence or to the landlord, other than normal wear and tear, or any unpaid utility or sewer charged that the tenant was obligated to pay under the rental agreement. These itemized withholdings must be presented to the tenant in writing and delivered within forty (45) days of the lease termination. The itemized list must contain the cost of repair for each damaged item and the amounts/lease on which the landlord intends to assess the tenant. Also, with the list, the landlord must include a check or money order for the difference between the damages claimed and the amount of the security deposit held by the landlord. If the landlord fails to comply with this section, the tenant may recover the full value of the security deposit, plus reasonable attorney costs.

NOTE
If you are a landlord or a tenant and you feel your rights have been violated, call Tate & Bowen LLP at (317) 296-5294.

DISCLAIMER:
All information included in the above blog is solely for informational purposes. The information above does not create an attorney/client relationship and should not be interpreted as legal advice. Seek legal advice on the topic before relying on any information contained herein, as laws change and the information may be out-of-date. The author of this blog is licensed to practice law in the state of Indiana.

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Indiana law on Sealing and Expungement of Conviction Records is contained in IC 35-38-9-1. The law allows for the expungement of arrests that do not result in a conviction and expungement of certain convictions. Arrests that do not result in conviction include those that end in diversion programs. An individual seeking to expunge an arrest that did not result in a conviction must wait one (1) year after the date of arrest or one (1) year after date of appellate opinion vacating a conviction (or date adjudication is deemed final). It is important to note that the time starts from the date of arrest. There is no filing fee for requesting expungement under this option. If you are seeking to file under this option, it is advantageous to contact an attorney to determine the proper filing and to be sure you are completing it correctly. If you are seeking to expunge more than one arrest, separate filings will be involved.

For information on expungements of criminal convictions, and information on the required wait time for misdemeanor and certain felony convictions, please contact the attorneys at Tate & Bowen LLP to help guide you through the process at 317-296-5294.

DISCLAIMER:
All information included in the above blog is solely for informational purposes. The information above does not create an attorney/client relationship and should not be interpreted as legal advice. Seek legal advice on the topic before relying on any information contained herein, as laws change and the information may be out-of-date. The author of this blog is licensed to practice law in the state of Indiana.

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